Defending Civic Space Against “Foreign Agent” Laws: How Should Donors Respond?

A wave of “foreign agent” laws has further chilled civic space around the world in recent years. As civil society actors devise strategies to push back against these repressive tactics, private philanthropy and bilateral and multilateral donors have vital support roles to play. They can help civil society prepare for future challenges, so that it is organised not only to respond to evolving forms of repression but also to get ahead of them by tackling their root causes.

This was post was originally published on European Democracy Hub

Responding to “foreign agent” and wider security laws

In a growing number of countries, autocratic and illiberal democratic governments alike are adopting Russia’s model of restricting the free exercise of civic power by targeting foreign funding and international assistance. From Georgia and Nicaragua to India and Israel, governments intent on curbing or controlling civil society and peaceful dissent have introduced “foreign agent” and other restrictive measures to achieve their goals. In response, funders have increased or provided new resources through established mechanisms to enable civil society’s mobilisation against such legislation. Yet this support is sometimes criticised for not being early or swift enough to forestall restrictive measures or for not being sufficiently long-term to build the collective power needed to prevent such measures and safeguard civic space. Even when efforts to push back against a proposed “foreign agent” or other restrictive law were successful, such as in the case of Georgia in 2023, the government was able to pass it later by repackaging it or once international attention waned.

Chilling as they are, “foreign agent” laws are just one aspect of a broader effort to repress the operation of free civic space. States are increasingly turning to what the Civic Futures initiative calls the security playbook. It includes “foreign agent” and other laws that impede and criminalise activism, technologies that surveil and censor activists, and fear-based narratives that portray civil society (and its donors) as undermining national sovereignty and security.

This growth in the abuse of state security power is a systemic and structural issue. It is enabled by an expanding global security (especially counter-terrorism) architecture codified in resolutions and standards set by the United Nations (UN) and other bodies like the Financial Action Task Force; by defence, security, and technology industries that are ever more intertwined with the state and its functions; and by a public discourse on security and rights and freedoms that is shaped by state, corporate, and social media actors who foster toxic narratives of othering, fear, scarcity, and competition.

A reactive and ad hoc response will not stem the attack on civic space. Funders of civil society must develop strategies and provide relevant resources that address it, with long-term approaches to disrupt and transform the security paradigm harming civil society.

The role of private philanthropy and official donors

Enabling an effective approach by civil society to prevent or respond to “foreign agent” laws and the wider security playbook should draw on the respective strengths of philanthropic foundations and official donors, using their complementarity to tailor the approach to the context. This requires good coordination among funders as well as with local civil society.

Philanthropic foundations, especially intermediary funders of grassroots actors, can move resources more rapidly than many official donors. When urgent action is needed, intermediary funders can provide support as quickly as within 24 hours. Foundations can also make resources fully flexible to enable partners to be agile amid shifting contexts, and to integrate security and collective care as part of pushback efforts. Where official donors are willing but unable to directly offer core and flexible funding, placing their resources with funders of grassroots actors, like the Fund for Global Human Rights, and standing mechanisms, such as Lifeline – Embattled CSO Assistance Fund, means they can invest in preventive strategies and front-load the response for speed and agility.

Where scale of funding matters most, official donors and larger foundations can offer the resources that broad civil society coalitions and certain strategies (such as strategic litigation) require. Other foundations and intermediary funders can offer smaller grants to enable unusual or higher-risk interventions; to meet complex, evolving security needs; or to support ad hoc meetings and travel necessitated by circumstances. Those in both categories are capable of short-term and sustained funding alike, but ensuring consistency and continuity for partners requires more communication and coordination between them.

Civil society actors operating in highly restrictive contexts may face heightened scrutiny, so their seeking or receiving foreign funding could be weaponised against them. In such cases, the nature of the framework of funding can alleviate their burden and reduce risk. The administrative requirements and need for transparency in using taxpayers’ money can hinder official donors from offering a lighter, more discreet process. But private foundations can make the funding process simple, quick, and accessible (for example, by advertising opportunities and receiving proposals in local languages) to minimise the demands on groups that have their hands full with addressing the threat of “foreign agent” or other security laws and measures, or that would face increased risk if they put anything in writing.

Funders also have different potential for advocacy. Official donors can use formal channels for diplomatic dialogue and draw on agreed international and regional standards, or they can link their concerns to trade, debt, aid, or accession negotiations to blocs such as the European Union. By contrast, advocacy by philanthropic foundations may be rejected as further unwanted or malign foreign influence, jeopardise their in-country presence, or put their local partners at greater risk. Official donors and philanthropy need to consider the potential for backlash to any advocacy on their part, and whether taking a public stance or quietly engaging well-placed officials, or a combination of both, may be most effective. For example, when Kenya’s President William Ruto accused the Ford Foundation of funding and fomenting the protests against the 2024 Finance Bill, the foundation successfully used public statements and private high-level dialogue to de-escalate. It managed to flip the narrative from one in which it was seen as engaging in “foreign interference” to one portraying it as a valued partner in Kenya’s long-term development.

When it comes to collaboration among funders, philanthropic foundations have a track record of pooling funds to support the protection of civic space and human rights defenders, such as with the Joint Civic Defense Fund in Nigeria. Governments also pool their funds and channel them through international non-governmental organisations for implementing actions. One example is ProtectDefenders.eu, the European Commission’s flagship initiative to protect human rights defenders at risk. However, there are very few initiatives that enable official donors, philanthropy, and the private sector to invest funds in a joint mechanism for shared strategic aims and action. Examples include the UN Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund, the Equality Fund (which innovatively leverages Canadian government funding and private-sector investment), and the Powered by the People initiative (launched by the US Agency for International Development and Humanity United).

In terms of exchange and learning, there are spaces where philanthropy convenes to share information and insights into strategies to deal with “foreign agent” laws and similar restrictive measures. One is the Human Rights Funders Network, which has produced a Crisis Coordination Playbook with the Peace and Security Funders Group. There are also ad hoc discussion spaces where all official donors, philanthropy, and the private sector share analysis on the operating environment and the state of the field (such as at the Donor Day organised by Front Line Defenders before its biannual Dublin Platform). And there is a nascent informal community of practice on protecting human rights defenders – hosted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Humanity United, and Action Aid Denmark – that brings UN, government, and philanthropy donors together with civil society protection actors and mechanisms.

Many of these joint mechanisms respond to the pressing need for greater protection for activists. But, despite mounting threats to human rights and civil society being rooted in the systemic abuse of state power, there are almost no sustained structures or spaces that bring together all donors and initiatives as an ecosystem to tackle the issue with a long-term preventive approach. Convening official donors, private philanthropic foundations, intermediary funders, international non-governmental organisations, and the private sector to perform ongoing analysis, set priorities, coordinate, and collaborate in funding and other action and learning would leverage their complementarity most effectively.

Preparing for future challenges

While of particular concern to the policymaking and philanthropic community, “foreign agent” laws are just one tactic from the security playbook that states use to repress civil society. The justification and means for this chilling phenomenon is increasingly a warped perception of security. With securitisation set to be a key determinant limiting civic space in the coming decade, it is likely that states will co-opt future trends or developments to justify and reinforce their use of the security playbook. Funders must be ready to support civil society in its efforts to pre-empt or push back against harmful securitisation.

Already, authoritarian and fundamentalist actors are threatening democratic values and systems by preying on public frustration with the rising cost of living and by stoking anti-immigrant and anti-gender sentiments. Their narratives drive support for populist authoritarian strategies and empower anti-rights actors and their repressive visions of law and order, resulting in securitisation that targets racialised and other minorities.

Another immediate issue is the regional and global spillovers from the growing number of conflicts around the world. Security technologies are being abused at borders to target migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and activists standing in solidarity with them. The Israel/Gaza war, especially, has spurred restrictions on protest and speech, and resulted in the cessation of foreign funding to civil society organisations in and near the affected conflict locations.

A further important trend is how the combination of rapid advances in technology and weak regulation creates fertile conditions for invoking security to expand surveillance, such as through biometrics and facial-recognition technology in public and private spaces, which exacerbates the racialised impacts of securitisation.

Finally, there are risks related to states securitising the response to the climate crisis through emergency measures (similarly to the response to the Covid-19 pandemic), the application of public order and anti-terrorism laws against climate protesters, militarisation to deal with climate impacts, and climate finance that enables authoritarianism.

With its systemic and structural underpinning, and with the evolving conditions fuelling the securitisation of civic space, tackling the security playbook requires investment in sustained preventive and transformative initiatives that foster a civic space free from unjustified limitations in which civil society can thrive.

Protection mechanisms and funding are essential, and need more investment, but they are not enough to deter abuses through “foreign agent” laws and other tools in the security playbook. As a deterrent, donors and their allies must also raise the political costs of attacking human rights defenders and civic space.

More fundamentally, the systems and structures that enable these attacks must be changed. This requires long-term investments in strengthening civil society’s collective power to develop, and to build popular support for, an alternative vision of security with civic space and participation at its heart.

Private philanthropy has begun to organise for the long haul when it comes to this agenda. In 2023, the Funders Initiative for Civil Society and the Fund for Global Human Rights launched Civic Futures, an initiative over the next 10 to 20 years to build an ecosystem of funders and civil society collaborating through a civic playbook to counter security overreach.

Some official donors are also heeding the call to increase their responses. In the European Commission, the Directorate-General for International Partnerships, which is responsible for international development policy, has invested in a new €50 million, seven-year programme called the EU System for an Enabling Environment. This will create an early-warning system and a multifaceted funding and advocacy mechanism to safeguard civic space and to ensure an enabling environment for civil society.

Ultimately, regardless of their type, funders must shift from a largely defensive approach that deals with the manifestations of the problem – such as “foreign agent” laws and the protection needs they create for civil society and human rights defenders – to coordinating and collaborating as an ecosystem to provide resources to and accompany civil society in tackling it at its roots. Only then can we pursue transformative change for a truly enabling environment in which civil society thrives.

Written by James Savage, Program Director at Fund for Global Human Rights